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Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages 
in the Presence of Contracting Frictions 
 
This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim 
damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting 
frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous 
policy changes, PPLD would not be distortionary or redistributive. If contracting frictions exist, 
then PPLD would have efficiency and redistributive effects, though the direction and 
magnitude depends on the size of PPL damages vis-à-vis expected damages under existing 
contract law. This study clarifies the conditions under which PPLD would decrease efficiency 
and protect growers. 
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   1
This study investigates the potential efficiency and distributional effects of statutory 
intervention that would impose termination damages on agricultural production contracts.  
Recent legislation aimed at protecting growers have included stipulations that allow 
growers to claim damages from contractors if contracts are prematurely terminated.  A 
model state law called the Producer Protection Act includes a section that grants growers 
the right to damages.  All or parts of this act have been proposed in Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, and South Dakota.   
The typical justification for such legislation is that growers operating under 
production contracts often make large fixed investments in modern production facilities.
1   
These investments are often required by the contractor when a grower is entering into a 
production contract or is seeking continuation of an existing contract.  Because some of 
these production facilities must be customized to the specific requirements of contractors, 
the facilities can be relationship-specific and have little to no alternative use.   At the same 
time, contractors have been known to prematurely terminate or fail to renew contracts, 
leaving growers with unpaid debts that were used to finance the facilities.
2   
While farm advocates continue to promote legislation to protect growers, 
agricultural economists have conducted relatively few formal studies of grower protection 
legislation (Wu 2006).  Most published articles tend to be descriptive commentaries, 
although the author is aware of two formal studies.  The first is the study by Lewin-
                                                 
1 Cunningham (2005) reports that broiler houses can exceed $170,000 per house and usually a minimum of 
two houses are needed.  Loans are usually amortized over 15 years and the life of houses can reach 30 years.  
2 Broiler growers typically operate under flock-to-flock contracts.  Hog farmers often receive 5 to 10 year 
contracts but these contracts are still shorter than the duration of the loan or the expected life of the houses.   2
Solomons (2000), which investigates direct restrictions on termination.  LS models these 
restrictions as a reduction in the probability of a grower being terminated.  This study, in 
contrast, does not investigate direct restrictions and instead focuses on termination 
damages.  The second article by Lee, Wu and Fan (2008) is more closely related to this 
article because it also focuses on damages.  However, there are two important differences 
between the LWF article and this article.  First, LWF discuss the effects of moving from an 
initial situation where termination does not result in damage awards to a post-legislation 
scenario where termination always results in damages.  However, in practice, existing 
contract law may, in some circumstances, award growers with damages even in the 
absence of producer protection legislation.  This paper takes existing contract law as given, 
but introduces the possibility of enforcement errors which might make it difficult for 
growers to recover damages.  The value of producer protection legislation (henceforth PPL 
damages or PPLD) is that PPLD can reduce these enforcement errors.  Hence, the relevant 
benchmark for PPLD is not a world free of termination damages, but rather a second best 
world where existing contract law functions imperfectly.  Second, LWF assume that the 
level of relationship-specific investments and is exogenously determined.  This paper 
examines both exogenous and endogenous cases.  The endogenous case is important as 
some researchers suggest that, in some circumstances, processors can incentivize growers 
by requiring growers to make excessive relationship-specific investments (e.g. Lewin-
Solomons 2000; Vukina and Leegomonchai 2006).  Moreover, in cases where growers 
earn rents, as in efficiency-wage or limited liability models, contractors can extract away   3
these rents by raising the level of investment; that is, the investment can be used as an 
implicit “entry fee” (e.g. Carmichael 1985) that reduces the cost of incentive provision.    
  The major findings of this paper are as follows.  First, if there are no contracting 
frictions, then no economic distortions emerge under PPLD.  Intuitively, even if PPLD 
increases expected liabilities of contractors, contractors can factor future liabilities into the 
initial contract price.  Thus, overall contracting costs are unaffected.  Second, if there are 
contracting frictions, perhaps caused by credit market imperfections or grower wealth 
constraints, then contractors are constrained in their ability to redesign contracts to offset 
changes in expected liabilities.  In this case, PPLD might have both distributional and 
efficiency effects, but the direction and magnitude of the effects depend on the size of PPL 
damages relative to the size of expected damages under existing law.  Specifically, when 
enforcement errors are high so that it is costly for growers to recover damages under 
existing law, then expected damages are low under existing law.  In this case, PPLD will 
likely increases contractors’ expected liabilities making it more expensive for contractors 
to implement incentives for high performance.  At the same time, growers benefit as their 
expected profits increase. In contrast, when enforcement errors are low and courts are 
likely to award large damages under existing law, then PPLD might actually improve 
efficiency while reducing grower welfare.  Third, even when investments are endogenous, 
contractors are unlikely to impose an excessive level of relationship-specific investments 
on growers.  Intuitively, the contractor is the residual claimant of the total surplus from the 
contractual relationship, minus any cost of incentive provision.  Hence, the processor 
wants to maximize total surplus while minimizing the cost of incentive provision.  While   4
increasing the level of investment can act as an implicit “entry fee” and reduce the cost of 
incentive provision, it nevertheless reduces total surplus, as total surplus is joint profits 
minus investment costs.  Moreover, excessive investments might also increase expected 
liabilities because damages might depend on investments.  The net effect is that there is a 
negative benefit to the processor of marginally increasing the level of investment beyond 
the technologically required level.   
New Damages Legislation versus Existing Contract Law 
Before discussing the formal model, it is important to discuss institutional details and 
enforcement errors that make it difficult for growers to recover damages under existing 
contract law.  This provides justification for the assumptions used in the model.  
Even in the absence of PPLD, contract law suggest that courts can award either 
reliance or expectation damages where reliance damages compensate the victim of breach 
in an amount that leaves him as well off as he would be had he not contracted in the first 
place, while expectation damages would leave the victim as well off as he would be if the 
contract were honored.  However, many law and economics scholars recognize that 
contract law works imperfectly in that it may be costly for a victim to bring a dispute to 
court and recover damages.  Such “enforcement errors” can reduce the level of expected 
damages and therefore erode the power of contract law to incentivize optimal behavior.
3    
There are reasons to believe that enforcement errors might be non-trivial in 
agricultural production contracting.  First, some contracts contain arbitration clauses, 
which may preclude growers from suing for damages under the Uniform Commercial 
                                                 
3 The reader should not confuse expected damages with expectation damages.  Expectation damages is a 
legal concept describing a particular level of damages.   5
Code (UCC).  For example, in 2002, Tyson severed relationships with 132 hog growers in 
Arkansas and Oklahoma.  The growers sued for damages but Tyson alleged that a 
mandatory arbitration clause in the contracts did not allow the growers to sue (Moeller 
2003).  Second, even when farmers have access to courts, how judges interpret laws can 
differ so there is no guarantee of success for growers.  Moreover, the probability of success 
in lawsuits can depend on whether growers are determined to be “merchants” and courts 
are divided about this issue (Hamilton 1995).  Third, if a contract is short term, then the 
contract may be similar to an employment-at-will contract, which makes it difficult for 
growers to claim damages.  Even if growers argue that oral agreements and implied actions 
(e.g. long term investments) make agreements long term contracts, courts may not agree. 
PPLD might remedy this by specifying that contract length must match the life of the 
assets.  Fourth, courts may have trouble determining the size of damages.  If damages are 
difficult to assess, courts may refuse to award “speculative damages.”  Finally, under the 
UCC, growers may have difficulty recovering damages because production contracts do 
not involve a sale of goods.  The UCC generally applies to contracts for the sale of goods 
and not for services such as raising livestock for another party (Hamilton 1995).  In short, 
the process of trying to recover damages under existing law can be difficult and time 
consuming.  Thus, for modeling purposes, it is reasonable to assume that the average 
grower will receive damages upon termination only with probability less than one.   
One objective of PPLD is to eliminate ambiguities surrounding growers’ rights to 
claim damages so that enforcement errors are minimized. Most proposed PPL also specify 
a level of damages that is equal to reliance damages; i.e., if growers are terminated, then   6
“Damages shall be based on the value of the remaining useful life of the structures, 
machinery or equipment involved” (Section 8 of the Producer Protection Act).    
The above discussion suggests that, for modeling purposes, there are two channels 
through which PPLD might operate.  First, there will be a reduction in enforcement errors.  
Second, PPL damages will be set at a level that permits growers to recover the investments 
that they made to meet contract requirements.   
The Model 
The model is based on a principal-agent framework of moral hazard where the agent 
exhibits limited liability. Principal-agent models are useful for analyzing livestock 
contracts (e.g. Knoeber 2000). The model also shares features with classic law and 
economics models that analyze damages for breach of contract (e.g. Barton 1972).  The 
assumptions are that a processor (principal) contracts with a grower (agent) in order to 
produce a commodity that serves as an input for a final food product.  The processor’s 
revenue from the food product depends on the quality of the input commodity.  The word 
“quality” serves as a proxy for any performance factor that enhances the processor’s 
revenue.  Thus, “quality” can be replaced with any other value-adding performance factor 
such as on-time deliveries, niche characteristics, low levels of pathogens, etc.  
For simplicity, quality can only assume two levels: “high” and “low.”  The 
processor’s revenue is denoted by () R yk y =  where y is quality and k≥ 0 is a scalar.  When 
quality is high, it assumes some positive value y > 0 whereas when it is low, y=0.
4  
                                                 
4 Assuming zero revenue under low quality greatly simplifies the notation.  Under the modeling assumptions 
outlined in this section, defining revenue under low quality to be some positive number less than y would add 
little additional insight at the cost of increased notational burden.     7
Moreover, quality is assumed to be stochastically related to “effort” exerted by the grower 
where effort is unobservable to the processor so there is moral hazard.   
The principal-agent model is based on a risk neutral processor and a risk neutral 
grower who faces a limited liability (LL) constraint.  LL constraints have both theoretical 
and practical appeal (e.g. Innes 1990; Demougin and Garvie 1991).  On the practical side, 
LL constraints act as “payment floors” that prevent the processor from promising 
excessively low or negative payments in some states of the world.  This constrains 
processors from using “sticks” or severe punishments to motivate growers.   In practice, 
agricultural contracts implicitly contain payment floors because contracts with “negative 
payments” where growers pay processors in some states of the world are unheard of.  
While in principle negative payments can be specified as part of an optimal contract, 
contracting frictions, such as wealth constraints, might make negative payments infeasible.  
In some cases, even positive but low payments might be ruled out due to credit market 
constraints.  For instance, some lenders will not approve loans unless the contract 
guarantees the grower at least some minimal payment in all states of nature.
5   
On the theoretical side, it is well known that the moral hazard problem is trivial if 
there is no agent risk aversion or LL constraints, as first best can always be achieved by 
making the agent the residual claimant. Thus, one needs to impose either LL constraints or 
risk aversion on the agent for moral hazard to matter.
6  The LL model is used in this article 
                                                 
5A hog contractor that the author spoke to suggested that they could not “punish growers” by reducing their 
payments below $34 for feeder to finish space of 7.5 sqft per pig.  If deducts were used, the lenders would 
not approve of loans to growers for constructing production facilities. 
6 This is not to imply that risk aversion and limited liability are perfect modeling substitutes for all situations.  
There are some well known qualitative differences.  For example, under limited liability the agent cares less   8
because it has two advantages over the risk aversion model; namely, that it is (1) easier to 
solve, and (2) it leaves open the possibility that growers (agents) can earn rents above 
reservation levels.  That is, if the principal wants to implement stronger incentives, it has to 
provide increasingly larger bonuses (deducts are ruled out), which increases expected rents 
of the agent.  The existence of rents makes the LL model more attractive for investigating 
policy issues with redistributive effects.  Moreover, Allen and Lueck (1995) argue that risk 
neutral models with transactions costs may be better suited for modeling agricultural 
problems than contracting models with risk aversion.  Knoeber (2000) suggests that risk 
costs may not be the primary factor in livestock contracts in the U.S.  
The model assumes that a processor offers a contract conditional on the grower 
making or sharing in a large upfront investment to build/upgrade production facilities with 
the latest technology.  Thus, the processor must promise the grower profit of a sufficient 
size to ensure that the grower’s participation constraint is satisfied.  If the processor 
terminates the grower prematurely, then the grower suffers losses, as he would be left with 
debt and no future profit.  Assume that the total monetary cost of the investment is denoted 
by I and that the processor requires the grower to bear at least a share, if not all, of the cost.  
Thus, let  P G I II =+ where  P I  and  G I  denote the processor and grower’s share of the 
investment cost, respectively. The investment is also assumed to be relationship-specific so 
that its salvage value is zero outside the relationship.  Assuming full asset specificity does 
not reduce the generality of the results but simplifies notation.
7  The paper analyzes both 
                                                                                                                                                    
about the state of the nature (because he is protected by LL in bad states) and, thus, he behaves as if he were 
risk lover (see Laffont and Martimort 2002, p. 121 for a discussion). 
7 For modeling purposes, all that matters is that I  loses some value outside the relationship.  It is also 
possible to allow the processor to choose the degree of asset specificity.  However, this was not done because   9
the case when I is exogenous (e.g. if assets are discrete/indivisible and the parties are price 
takers in the market for assets) and the case when I is endogenous.  In the latter case, the 
processor can choose the level of I subject to some minimal technology constraint I I ≥ .  
Moreover, the processor can choose the share of the cost borne by the grower,  G I .  
The timing of the game is as follows.  In stage 1, the processor offers a contract to 
the grower and specifies I (if endogenous),  G I , and  P I .  In stage 2, prior to production, the 
state of nature reflecting market conditions is revealed.  In the bad state, the processor 
views continuation of the contract to be unprofitable and terminates the contract.   The 
grower suffers a loss in the amount  G I  because I is relationship-specific. If the good state 
of nature occurs, the game continues into stage 3, the production stage.  The grower exerts 
effort, which is followed by the realization of quality, which in turn triggers contract 
payments to the grower.     
The realization of the state of nature in stage 2 is assumed to be verifiable and 
allows for non-performance related contract termination.  Bad states of the world (e.g. 
adverse economic conditions) are common in many industries and can induce firms to 
close plants, lay off workers and/or terminate suppliers.  The probability of a good state is 
denoted by v.  In the good state, it is assumed that the scalar k in the processor’s revenue 
function takes the value k=1 so that R(y)=ky=y.   The probability of the bad state is 1-v and 
results in k=0 so that R(y)=0.  Thus, an exogenous event can cause the processor’s revenue 
to vary independently of grower performance.  Total surplus (revenue minus all costs) is 
negative in the bad state of nature.  Because the grower is promised positive stage 3 profit 
                                                                                                                                                    
according to Erkal (2007), asset specificity is largely driven by the need for specialized inputs for 
downstream goods.  Thus, asset specificity may ultimately depend on the downstream product portfolio.   10
to offset the cost of the upfront investment, negative surplus in the bad state implies that 
the processor makes negative profits.  Hence the processor prefers to terminate the contract 
in the bad state.  Assuming that the grower might be terminated before the production 
stage may seem unrealistic.  However, allowing for some production before termination is 
not essential – what is essential is that the grower might not receive promised 
compensation and this is captured by the model.  Similarly, allowing for multi-period 
contracting would only increase complexity while offering little additional insight. 
If the contracting game reaches stage 3, the grower exerts unobservable effort 
which is stochastically related to quality.  Quality is assumed to be observable and 
verifiable so that it can be included in the contract. Effort is denoted by {0,1} e∈ and the 
cost of effort is given by ce where c > 0.  When the grower exerts high effort (e = 1), then 
the probability of high quality is ph .  When the grower exerts low effort (e = 0), then the 
probability of high quality is lh p pp =− Δ  where  0 h pp >Δ > .  Once quality is realized, the 
processor makes contractually specified payments  ( , ) lh ww = w  where  x w is the payment to 
the grower contingent on whether quality is high (x h = ) or low (x l = ).  The LL 
constraint is incorporated with the restriction 0 x w ≥ . Reservation profits for both the 
processor and grower are assumed to be zero in the model. 
The final assumption is  ( ) max{ , 0} hl vpy c I v py I − −≥ − .  This assumption implies 
that contract acceptance and high effort lead to first best ex ante efficiency.
8  In the special 
case of  0 l vp y I −≥, the above condition reduces to  py c Δ ≥ .  These assumptions are 
                                                 
8 The condition  () m a x {, 0 } hl vpy c I v py I −− ≥ −  implicitly assumes that there is efficient ex post breach 
which yields a surplus of zero in the bad state.  The alternative to breach is continuation which is ex post 
inefficient as it yields negative surplus under the modeling assumptions.      11
reasonable because if high quality does not create sufficient value, then there is no reason 
to contract in the first place.  Thus, these assumptions allow us to focus on the most 
interesting case where high effort is consistent with social welfare maximization.  
Conditions   ( ) 0 h vpy c I −− ≥  and  py c Δ ≥  characterize first best outcomes and serve as 
important benchmarks for subsequent analyses.
9  It is important to note that the processor’s 
objectives may not be consistent with social welfare maximization, as the processor’s 
profit is social surplus minus LL rents (to be made precise shortly) paid to the grower to 
incentivize effort.  Thus, the processor might choose to minimize LL rents rather than 
pursue high effort and social welfare. 
Optimal Contracting under Existing Contract Law 
This section characterizes efficiency and distribution under existing contract law.  The 
results of this section provide a benchmark for assessing PPLD in the next section.  The 
analysis begins by describing contracting outcomes in the shadow of existing contract law 
where courts might award either reliance or expectation damages if a lawsuit for contract 
breach is successful.  However, due to enforcement errors, there is no guarantee that a 
grower will pursue or win a lawsuit.  To model this, let [0,1] s∈  denote the probability that 
a grower will receive damages if terminated.  Thus, even if a court awards damages D 
under a successful lawsuit, expected damages ex ante issD .  When s is close to 1, 
enforcement errors are low but when s is close to zero, enforcement errors are high.     
The processor’s objective is to maximize expected profit through the design of an 
optimal incentive contract.  That is, the processor decides on a preferred effort level and 
                                                 
9 These conditions are compatible with the assumption y =0 under low quality.   12
then designs a menu of contract payments  ( , ) lh ww = w  that induce the grower to choose 
the processor’s preferred effort level.  Moreover, if the bad state of nature is realized, the 
processor must choose to either terminate and pay damages with probability s, or to 
continue and operate at a loss.  Therefore, the processor solves    
(1)    [ ][ ] [ ] { } { }
;, , max (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )max ,
PG
b
hl h hl l P e eI I ve p e p yw e p e pw I v s D π +− − −− −− − +− −
w     
 
subject to the grower’s incentive compatibility (IC), participation, and LL constraints.  
Moreover,  P G I II =+ must hold.  The last term in (1) indicates that the processor must 
choose between terminating and facing expected damages, sD, or not terminating and 
earning continuation profit 
b
e π , where 
(2)   [ ] [ ] (1 ) 1 (1 ) 0
b
eh l h h l l ep e p w ep e p w π =− + − − − − − < . 
Define the binary variable 
(3)      { }
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= ⎪ ⎩
. 
Then the grower’s participation constraint, which requires the grower’s expected profit 
under the contract to be at least as high as his reservation payoff of zero, is   
(4)    [ ] [ ] [ ] { } (1 )(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) 0 hl h hl l G vv i e p e p w e p e p w c e v i s D I +− − +− +− −− − +− − ≥. 
Assume for now that I is exogenously determined.  Therefore, the processor only needs to 
determine  G I , which will also pin down  P I . The endogenous case is examined later.   
The grower’s IC constraint specifies the condition under which a rational grower 
chooses high effort ( 1 e = ) over low effort ( 0 e = ).  The grower chooses high effort over 
low effort if and only if his expected profit is higher under high effort; that is,    13
(5) 
[ ] [ ] { }
[] [ ] {}
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                                   (1 )(1 ) 1 (1 )
hh h l G
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which simplifies to 







Inequality (6) is the IC for implementing  1 e = but an optimal incentive contract should 
satisfy (6) with equality.











 represents the performance bonus for high effort.  Finally, the LL constraint is 
straightforward as it simply restricts all payments to 0 ≥ w . 
If the processor wants to implement e=1, two cases must be considered.  In case (i), 
sD is low enough that the processor finds it more profitable to terminate and pay damages 
rather than to continue in the bad state.  In case (ii), sD is so high that the processor will 
choose continuation even in the bad state.  The extended analysis of both cases is in the 
Wu (2010).  It is shown in there that, under existing contract law, which specifies reliance 
or expectation damages, the processor always terminates in the bad state.  Thus, we can 
focus on case (i) for the remainder of the paper.  
To determine the optimal level of  G I , substitute e=1, i=1, and (7) into (4) to get  








=++ −− ⎢⎥ Δ ⎣⎦
.  
                                                 
10 It is common in the contracting literature to impose weak rather than strong inequality.  As Laffont and 
Martimort (p. 37, footnote 9, 2000) point out, strict preference is easily obtained at an ε cost to the principal.   14
When (8) is strictly greater than zero, then the grower earns rents.  But whether rents exist 
or not depends on the size of  G I .  When  G I is large, the processor must compensate the 
grower accordingly to ensure that (8) is non-negative to satisfy the participation constraint.  
This requires  l w > 0, which means that the LL constraint does not bind.  But the processor 
never sets  l w  so high that the grower is left with rents.  
  On the other hand, when the size of  G I  is “low,” then the grower’s expected profit 
is large even with a relatively small wl.  But a low wl  implies that the LL constraint 0 l w ≥  
is close to binding leaving the processor with little slack to extract rents.  If the LL rent is 
large enough, then the grower’s expected profit is positive even with wl =0.   
REMARK 1:  Suppose that the processor wants to implement e=1 in the shadow of 








.   
Proof:   See the Wu (2010) for proofs of all remarks and propositions. 
 
Remark 1 precisely identifies the grower rent thresholds for  G I . These thresholds 
depend on exogenous parameters v (the probability of the good state), c (the marginal 
disutility of effort),  p Δ  (the gain in probability of high quality from choosing high effort), 
s  (the probability that  D will be paid), D, and l p (the probability of high quality given low 








 then the grower earns no rents because the processor can 
















































In order to determine the optimal choice of  G I , note from Remark 1 that the choice of  G I  
can affect the rents that the processor must pay the grower in order to provide incentives.  





Γ= + − ⎟ ⎢ Δ ⎣⎠
, the processor will increase  G I  in order 





Γ =+ −+ ∞ ⎟ ⎢ Δ ⎣ ⎠
,  G I  is high enough such 
that rents are eliminated so further increases in  G I  no longer benefit the processor.  As a 
consequence, if I
− ∈Γ , then the processor chooses  G I I = .  However, if I
+ ∈Γ , then the 
constraint  G I I ≤  may or may not bind.   While an increase in  G I  reduces the processor’s 
investment  P I , this will be exactly offset by an increase in  l w  that is necessary to ensure 
that the grower’s participation constraint is satisfied.  The net effect is that the processor is 
indifferent about the level of  G I
+ ∈Γ  so long as all constraints are met.  
PROPOSITION 1:  Suppose that the processor wants to implement e=1.  Then if I
− ∈Γ , 
then the optimal  G I  is  G I I = , but if I
+ ∈Γ , then the optimal  ˆ
G I
+ ∈Γ∩ Ι  where 
ˆ {: } GG I II Ι= ≤ .  If the processor only wants to implement e=0, then  ˆ
G I ∈Ι. 
Proposition 1 is consistent with the stylized observation that processors often require 
growers to make substantial investments in new production facilities.  Forcing growers to 
bear a large share of the cost serves to minimize LL rents, which lowers incentive costs.     16
The optimal level of  G I  along with (9) and (10) can be substituted into the 
processor and grower objective functions to generate profits under the optimal contract.     
The value functions of processors and growers serve as useful benchmarks for subsequent 
analysis of distributional issues.   
PROPOSITION 2:  The expected profits of the processor and grower under effort levels 
e=1 and e=0 under existing contract law are: 








=− − − + − − ⎨ ⎬
Δ ⎩⎭
 








=+ − − ⎨⎬
Δ ⎩⎭
 
  b)   0 el vp y I π = =−  
         0 0 e u = = .  
To assess efficiency, it is important to distinguish ex post from ex ante efficiency.  Ex ante 
efficiency refers to the effort level preferred by the processor at the contract formation 
stage.  Under the modeling assumptions, e=1 is ex ante efficient as it maximizes joint 
surplus.  Hence, if a processor designs a contract that induces e=1, then the processor’s 
action is consistent with ex ante efficiency.  
In contrast, ex post efficiency has to do with whether the processor should 
terminate the contract after observing the state of nature.  After observing the state of 
nature, the processor has to decide whether to continue with production under the contract 
that promises wl and wh or to terminate the contract and earn zero profit.  The fixed 
investment I is sunk and no longer matters in determining ex post efficiency. Given the 
modeling assumptions, it is ex post efficient for the processor to continue in the good state 
because k=1, which yields ex post surplus of either  0 h py c − >  or  0 l py> .  But under the   17
bad, k= 0 so that continuation results in ex post surplus of either  0 c − < or 0, which is 
weakly inefficient.  The extended analysis in Wu (2010) shows that, under existing 
contract law, which specifies either reliance or expectation damages, the processor always 
chooses to terminate in the bad state.  Hence, existing contract law induces ex post 
efficiency.  We can therefore focus on ex ante efficiency for the remainder of the paper.   
    Returning to ex ante efficiency, recall that contracting under high effort is always 
socially desirable and is characterized by the two conditions:  py c Δ ≥  (high effort 
enhances expected surplus) and  ( ) 0 h vpy c I − −≥ (expected surplus is positive under high 
effort).   However, because the processor’s payoff is expected surplus minus LL rents, the 
processor might deviate from the socially efficient outcome if LL rents are high.  The 
fundamental issue facing the processor when deciding to implement e=1 is whether the 
returns to high effort are worth the increase in LL rents.       
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The two inequalities in Proposition 3 are essentially the processor’s “incentive 
compatibility” and “participation constraints” for choosing high effort.  That is, if (a) is 
satisfied, then it is more profitable for the processor to choose e=1 instead of e=0.  Note 
that (a) is directly comparable to the first best condition  py c Δ ≥ .  When LL rents are large, 
there is a greater divergence between the two conditions so that the processor is less likely   18
to choose high effort.  Condition (b) acts like a participation constraint because if this 
inequality is violated, the processor earns negative profits and therefore does not offer a 
contract.  LL rents causes (b) to diverge from the first best condition  ( ) 0 h vpy c I −− ≥ .  
However, it is important to emphasize that a large I that minimizes LL rents is not always 
desirable.  A large I implies large fixed costs, which reduces surplus.  Hence, while a large 
I may reduce LL rents, this must be weighed against the overall reduction in surplus.   
The Economic Impact of Damages Introduced by Producer Protection Legislation 
There are two channels through which PPLD could impact outcomes.  First, PPLD 
eliminates, or at least reduces, enforcement errors by making it easier for growers to collect 
damages if their contracts are terminated.  Second, because PPLD enables growers to claim 
damages equal to the remaining useful life of fixed investments, the legislation effectively 
sets  G DI = .  For modeling purposes, it is convenient to make the simplifying assumption 
that, under PPLD, the enforcement error is eliminated so that s=1.
11  Also, because  
G DI =  implies reliance damages, the processor always terminates in the bad state so that 
ex post efficiency is achieved.  Setting s=1 and  G DI = , the grower’s profit (8) changes to 








=+− ⎢⎥ Δ ⎣⎦
.  
The next remark is analogous to Remark 1, which identifies the grower’s rent threshold.  
REMARK 2:  Suppose that the processor wants to implement e=1 in the shadow of PPLD.  









                                                 
11 An alternative assumption is that s <1 but that it is greater under PPLD than under existing contract law.  
But this captures essentially the same point while increasing complexity.     19
  Remark 2 can be compared to Remark 1 to determine how the  G I  threshold at 

















 from Remark 2, note that if the left-hand side of the latter 
inequality is greater than the left-hand side of the former inequality, then PPLD relaxes the 













.  Under existing law, D equals either expectation or 
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 to extract all rents.  In 
general, the optimal contract yields payments: 





















One can compare (12) and (13) to (9) and (10) to determine how the introduction of PPLD 
might affect contract payments.  Note that if PPLD is introduced and the LL constraint is   20
not binding, then  l w  will change from 














.  The latter is 
lower than the former if  G I  >sD; i.e., if the level of PPL damages exceeds expected 
liabilities under existing law, then  the processor will price this into l w .  In essence, if the 
LL constraint is not binding, it is possible for the processor to “undo” any government 
policy through contract redesign.
12  However, when LL constraints are binding, then there 
are contracting frictions that prevent the processor from undoing the regulation by 
lowering wl.   Thus, the grower’s profit increases at the expense of the processor’s.   
  In order to determine the optimal choice of  G I , it is trivial to show that Proposition 
1 applies in the case of PPLD, with the exception that the sets 
− Γ  and 
+ Γ  must be replaced 
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.   
PROPOSITION 4:  Suppose that the processor wants to implement e=1.  Then if  P I
− ∈Γ , 
then the optimal  G I  is  G I I = , but if  P I
+ ∈Γ , then the optimal  ˆ
GP I
+ ∈Γ∩ Ι  where 
ˆ {: } GG I II Ι= ≤ .  If the processor only wants to implement e=0, then  ˆ
G I ∈Ι. 
Given the similarity between Propositions 1 and 4, the qualitative prediction that 
processors will require growers to make substantial investments in new production 
facilities should still hold.   
Distribution  
Having discussed how the processor responds to new legislation through contract redesign, 
we are now ready to discuss the possible distributional effects of PPLD.  The optimal 
                                                 
12 A similar point was made by Lazear (1990) in the context of labor market regulation.   21
levels of  G I  along with (12) and (13) can be substituted into the processor and grower’s 
objective functions (1) and (4) to obtain expected profits.   
PROPOSITION 5: The expected profits to the processor and grower from implementing 
effort levels e=1 and e=0 in the shadow of PPLD are: 
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  b)   0 eP l vp y I π = =−  
         0 0 eP u = = . 
A comparison of Proposition 5(a) to Proposition 2(a) can provide insight into the 
redistributive effects of PPLD.  When the LL constraint is not binding, then from 2(a), we 
have  [ ] 1 eh vpy c I π = =− −  and  1 0 e u = = ; and from 5(a), we have  [ ] 1 eP h vpy c I π = = −−  and 
1 0 eP u = = .  Thus, the expected profits from 2(a) and 5(a) converge so that PPLD is not 
redistributive.  However, if the LL constraint is binding, then the processor cannot contract 
around PPLD, leaving the grower with rents. It is clear from 2(a) and 5(a) that the channel 
through which PPLD has impact is through grower rents.  Hence, the existence of grower 
rents is a necessary condition for redistributive effects to exist.  A sufficient condition is 
for the rents to differ across policy regimes.  Thus, if expected damages under PPLD is 
different from expected damages under existing law, then the profit functions in 5(a) and 
2(a) will diverge so that PPLD will be redistributive.  For example, note from 2(a) and 5(a) 
















.  Thus,  11 (1 )( ) eP e uu v I s D == − =− − ,   22
which is positive if I>sD.  In other words, if PPL damages are higher than expected 
damages under existing contract law, then the grower’s expected profit increases.   
COROLLARY 1: When contracting frictions cause the LL constraint to bind, then if  
I>sD,  the grower’s expected profit will increase under PPLD while the processor’s 
expected profit will decrease.  The reverse is true if I<sD. 
When enforcement errors are high (s is small), then I>sD is more likely. Thus, PPLD is 
most beneficial to growers when enforcement costs are high.  However, if existing contract 
law functions well (s is near one) and expectation damages are awarded, then I <sD is 
possible in which case growers might be better off under existing contract law.     
Finally, when the processor chooses to implement e=0, damages have no impact on 
the profits of either growers or processors.  The logic is that, if the processor does not need 
to incentivize high effort, there are no LL rents.  But we have seen that the impact of PPLD 
primarily operates through LL rents. 
Ex Ante Efficiency 
Proposition 3 outlined the conditions under which the processor chooses high effort, which 
is ex ante efficient.  The introduction of PPLD alters these conditions.    
PROPOSITION 6: In the shadow of PPLD, the processor implements e=1 if 
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.  
Comparing Proposition 6 to Proposition 3 provides insights into how a PPLD might affect 
efficiency.   Recall that the inequality in Proposition 3(a) acts like an “IC constraint” for   23
the processor to implement high effort.  Once PPLD is introduced, the inequality in 
Proposition 3(a) changes to the inequality in Proposition 6(a).  Thus, a key issue is whether 
6(a) is more relaxed than 3(a).  If it is more relaxed, then PPLD reduces the cost of 
implementing high effort thereby moving outcomes toward first best.  Note that if the LL 
constraint is not binding, then PPLD has no impact since the two inequalities converge.  A 
divergence only occurs when there are contracting frictions that force the LL constraint to 
bind.  In this case, first best is not achieved under either regime, but one might want to 
know whether efficiency is higher under existing law or PPLD.  To determine this, note 
that the left-hand side of Proposition 3(a) and 6(a) are identical, but the right-hand sides 
diverge under binding LL constraints.  The inequality with the larger right-hand side 
implies lower efficiency as it is further away from the first best condition  py c Δ≥ . 
Comparing right hand sides, note that 
(1 ) ll pc pc vI
cI c s D
p pv v
−
+ −>+ + −
ΔΔ
 if Is D > .   
Thus, if expected damages under existing law is lower than PPL damages, then PPLD 
results in lower efficiency as processors face greater liability costs.  
  Recall that the condition in Proposition 3(b) is analogous to a “participation 
constraint” for the processor in that if this constraint is violated, the processor finds it 
unprofitable to contract for high effort.  The introduction of PPLD changes 3(b) to the 
inequality in Proposition 6(b).  These inequalities are identical except for the terms 














 in 6(b).   The former is greater 
than the latter if Is D > .  Thus, if LL is binding andIs D > , then PPLD makes it more   24
expensive for the processor to contract in the first place, which might decrease social 
efficiency by reducing the number of contracting opportunities in the marketplace.   
COROLLARY 2: PPLD is less ex ante efficient than existing contract law if Is D > .    
To summarize, the relative efficiency of PPLD vis–à–vis existing contract law depends on 
(1) whether there are contracting frictions; (2) the size of enforcement errors; and (3) the 
size of court awarded damages under existing law.  Without contracting frictions, PPLD is 
unlikely to decrease efficiency.  However, if contracting frictions exist, then efficiency 
depends on whether PPL damages exceed expected damages under existing law.  If 
existing law is highly imperfect and/or courts are reluctant to award large damages, then 
PPLD might actually decrease efficiency as it increases processors’ expected liabilities, 
making it less profitable for processors to offer contracts that incentivize high effort.
13     
Endogenous Relationship Specific Investments 
So far, the analysis has been carried out under the assumption that the level of total 
investment I is exogenous.  This section examines the impact of PPLD if I is endogenous 
so that the processor can specify not only the share  G I but also I as part of the contract.   
Suppose that technology constraints only requires a minimal investment of  I .  
Then a question of interest is whether the processor will requireI I > .  A processor may 
                                                 
13 These results depend on the assumption that processors cannot charge growers “entry fees” for contracting 
opportunities.  Carmichael (1985) suggests that when agents earn rents, the principal should be able charge 
an entry fee that is weakly less than the rents.  By extracting the rents, the processor can always implement 
e=1. Intuitively, when the processor implements high effort, it may have to pay LL rents. But if the processor 
can extract the rent with an entry fee, then implementing high effort is not costly to the processor. While 
entrance fees have theoretical appeal, there are reasons why they may not be relevant for agricultural 
contracting.  First, one rarely observes entrance fees in actual agricultural contracts.  Second, some 
economists provide empirical arguments against entry fees. Dickens, et. al. (1989) suggest that “...implicit 
limits on bonding and upfront payments reflects society’s unwillingness to enforce bonding contracts.”  
Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) show that even in experimental settings, subjects rarely use entry fees.     25
want to do this because, by Remarks 1 and 2, a higher level of  G I  can potentially reduce 
LL rents.  Given the constraint GP I II + = , a higher level of I gives the processor more 
flexibility to increase G I , which can potentially serve as a proxy entry fee to facilitate ex 







 so that grower rent is guaranteed to exist under the minimal 
investment level for all values of s and D.
14     
To determine the levels of  G I  and I  that the processor would endogenously 
specify in a contract, it is useful to start with an intuitive discussion.  Note that the 
processor’s profits for a given level of I and  G I  is     
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where  P G I II =+ and I I ≥ .  Recall from Proposition 1 that when I
− ∈Γ , then the 
processor can increase its profits by increasing  G I  until  G I I = .  Increasing  G I  is profitable 









causing the grower to decrease effort, which leaves total surplus unchanged but shifts a 
higher fraction of the surplus to the processor.  This does not affect the grower’s 
participation constraint as the participation constraint will not bind until LL rents are 
completely eliminated.  Thus, so long as LL rents are positive, an increase in  G I  is a 
costless way for the processor to extract grower rents.  Second, an increase in  G I  means 
                                                 
14 Note that if no LL rents exist, the analysis becomes trivial as there is no need for entry fees.   26
that the processor can decrease its own investment  P I  while maintaining total investment 
at I .  Hence, the processor has an incentive to expand  G I  until  0. P I =  
 When  I is endogenous, the processor has the option of increasing I above the 
technologically determined level of investment,  I .  At first, this may appear attractive as it 
gives the processor the flexibility to relax the constraint  G I I ≤  so that it can increase  G I  
and extract more LL rents.  However, there is a key difference between this case and the 
case where I  is exogenous.  When I is exogenous, an increase in  G I  implies that the 
processor can reduce its own investment of  P I  due to the constraint  P G I II = + .  However, 
when I is endogenous, an increase in I does not necessarily imply that  P I  can be reduced 







we know from Proposition 1 that atI I =  , we have  G I I = which implies that  P I  is already 
at zero.  Hence, while an increase in I allows the processor to increase  G I  to extract LL 
rents, it no longer provides the processor with the benefit of reducing  P I .  As a 
consequence, the processor’s incentive to increase I is weaker than the case where I is 
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. 
Note from (15) that there is both a benefit and a cost to marginally increasing  G I .  The 
marginal benefit is reflected by a reduction in LL rents.  The marginal cost is comprised of 
two components.  First, an increase in  G I  via an increase in I implies that there is a   27
reduction in total surplus (recall that total surplus is given by  ( ) h vpy c I − − ).  Also note 
that the processor’s profit is total surplus minus any LL rents.  Hence, the processor 
maximizes profits by minimizing LL rents while maximizing total surplus.  Thus, while 
increasing I facilitates the reduction of LL rents, it reduces total surplus, which erodes the 
processor’s incentive to increase I.  Second, an increase in  G I  might also increase the 
processor’s expected liabilities via the term (1 ) vs D − .  Specifically, with reliance 
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.  In this case, (15) is negative so the 
processor will minimize I  by setting 
















.  This implies that (15) becomes zero so that the processor is indifferent 
about raising I  above  I  as any savings in LL rents will be offset by a decrease in surplus.   






  then under existing contract law and expectation 
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and grower rents are weakly positive.  Under reliance damages, we have 
* I I =  and 
grower rents are positive. 
Now consider the case where PPLD is introduced.  Under PPLD, s=1 and  G DI =
so the analysis of the PPLD case is fairly straightforward as it is nearly identical with the 
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which implies that the processor will seek to minimize I  by setting 
* I I = .    






, then under PPLD, the processor always chooses ܫכ ൌܫ  
and the grower earns rents. 
Now that the optimal choice of I has been determined, the processor and grower’s 
expected profit can be specified to determine distribution under each policy regime. 
PROPOSITION 9:  The expected profits to the processor and grower from implementing 
effort levels e=1 and e=0 when I is endogenous are: 
1.  Under existing contract law, 
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Proposition 9 can be used to determine how profits might be affected by PPLD.  A simple 
comparison of expected profits across policy regimes shows that, if expected damages 
under existing contract law is lower than under PPLD so that sD I < , then grower profit is 
higher and processor profit is lower under PPLD.     29
COROLLARY 3: With endogenous I,  if I sD > , then the grower’s expected profit will 
increase under PPLD while the processor’s expected profit will decrease.   
Note that this conclusion is very similar to Corollary 1 so that the endogeneity of I has 
little impact on the earlier results.  The next proposition outlines efficiency conditions 
under the endogeneity of  I.  
PROPOSITION 10: The processor implements e=1 if the following conditions hold: 
1.  Under existing contract law, 
(1 )
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2.  Under PPLD, 
















The inequalities in Proposition 10, 1(a) and 2(a), can be compared to the benchmark 
condition  py c Δ≥  to determine whether e=1 is more likely to be implemented under 
existing contract law or PPLD.  The policy regime that yields conditions closes to  py c Δ≥  
is the more efficient.  Similarly, the inequalities in Proposition 10, 1(b) and 2(b), can be 
compared to the first best condition  () 0 h vpy c I − −≥.   
   Focusing first on conditions 1(a) and 2(a), note that they are identical except for 
the right-hand side of each inequality.  The right-hand side of 1(a) deviates from the right-
hand side of the first best condition py c Δ ≥  by the amount 
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.  Hence, if 






, then PPLD increases the cost of implementing e=1.  It is 
straightforward to show that this true if sD I ≤ .   






 , one only has to 
determine whether 1(b) or 2(b) is more “relaxed” to determine which inequality is closer to 
the first best condition  () 0 h vpy c I −−≥ .  The regime that delivers the more relaxed 
inequality may promote more contracting opportunities for growers.  For example, if 
[] [] (1 ) (1 )
ll
hh
vp c vp c
vpy c vs D vpy c vI
pp
−− −− ≥ −− −−
ΔΔ
holds, then it is more profitable to 
contract for high effort under existing contract law.  This is true if  sD I < . 
COROLLARY 4: PPLD is less ex ante efficient than existing contract law if sD I < .  
To summarize, there are two important take away lessons in the case of 
endogenous I.  First, a rational processor has very weak incentives to require investments 
that exceed the technologically required level.  Thus, it is unlikely that a processor will 
extract away grower rents for bonding or entry fee purposes.  Intuitively, any reduction in 
LL rents is offset by a reduction in total surplus due to an increase in I.  Since the 
processor’s profit is essentially total surplus minus any LL rents, there is a one-to-one 
tradeoff between LL rents and total surplus which erodes the processor’s incentive to 
increase I.   Second, whether PPLD will reduce efficiency vis–à–vis existing contract law 
is similar to the results obtained with an exogenous I.     31
Conclusion and Discussion 
A general policy implication of the study is that the enactment of PPLD might not have 
uniform efficiency and distributional consequences across all agricultural subsectors and 
regions.  The likely consequences will depend on whether contracting frictions exist, the 
size of enforcement errors under existing contract law, and the size of damages courts are 
likely to award under existing law.  It is important for policy makers to bear these 
determinants in mind when formulating projections about the likely effects of PPLD.  For 
instance, if contracting frictions caused by credit market imperfections or wealth 
constraints are minimal, distortions will also be minimal as processors are able to 
restructure contracts to accommodate the legislation.  Under these conditions, PPLD might 
be an effective and non-distortionary way of protecting grower’s investments.   However, 
complications arise when contracting frictions reduce the ability of contractors to 
restructure contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes.  In this case, the 
enactment of PPLD will have both efficiency and redistributive effects, though the 
direction and magnitude depend on additional factors.  When enforcement errors are high 
and/or courts are reluctant to award large damages under existing contract law, then 
expected damages under existing law are likely to be lower than PPL damages.  This will 
increase expected profits of growers who obtain contracts, while reducing efficiency.  This 
scenario is likely to hold in sectors or regions where it is excessively costly for growers to 
sue processors for damages or in regions where courts determine growers to be 
“merchants” so that they are held to a higher standard of knowledge about commercial law.  
Moreover, court interpretations of whether growers are entitled to damage awards can also   32
depend on whether contracts are long term (e.g. in the hog sector) or short term (e.g. in the 
broiler sector).   In short, when growers find it difficult to collect damages under existing 
law, then PPLD will protect growers, but may decrease efficiency.  However, in sectors 
and regions where courts are effective at enforcing existing contract law, the introduction 
of PPLD may actually decrease grower welfare while increasing efficiency.   
  This study represents one of the first formal attempts at understanding recently 
proposed produced protection legislation, and is not without limitations.  First, because the 
analysis involves formal economic modeling, it emphasizes generalizable principles rather 
than concrete, sector specific details.  However, this research might provide a theoretical 
basis for sector specific empirical work that focuses on the determinants of the efficiency 
and redistributive effects of PPLD.  Second, this study does not address issues related to 
double-sided moral hazard where processors can take actions to minimize quality problems 
related to the inputs that they supply to growers.  According to some surveys, growers are 
concerned about the quality of inputs they receive from processors during the production 
process (Farmers’ Legal Action Group, Inc. 2001).  Thus, an important extension of this 
study is to incorporate double-sided moral hazard by assuming that processor actions can 
influence input quality.  Finally, this study focuses primarily on formal contracts where all 
aspects of performance are governed by explicit incentives.  However, in practice, 
contractual relationships typically involve a mixture of formal contracts and informal 
agreements and expectations.  Thus, future research might focus on whether results remain 
robust in environments characterized by relational contracting.  33
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